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Abstract – The 1986 Reykjavík Summit, where U.S. president Ronald Reagan and 
Soviet general secretary Mikhail Gorbachev held an impromptu meeting to discuss 
nuclear disarmament, suddenly thrust Iceland, a small marginalized island nation, into 
the world media spotlight. This article examines the way in which the summit as a 
global media event became a platform for a tremendous promotional effort where 
Icelanders, determined to make optimal use of this unique opportunity, performed and 
staged a variety of national narratives, emphasizing images linked to their heritage, their 
perceived exoticism, and uniquely Nordic and Northern traits. The article furthermore 
reviews the opportunistic mode and commercial imperative of the summit as a media 
event and analyzes a number of the conceptual configurations that the foreign press 
employed to encapsulate and represent Iceland as a symbolic host country for the peace 
negotiations of the summit. 
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Setting the 2008 banking and economic collapse aside as an 
unexpected negative manifestation of a nation’s aspiration towards 
international media exposure, few moments in Icelandic history have 
produced such a sudden, unprecedented, and welcome opportunity 
for national promotion as the Reagan–Gorbachev nuclear arms 
control summit, which was held on less than two weeks’ notice in 
Reykjavík in the autumn of 1986. While the event proved to be an 
important steppingstone in the history of Cold War superpower 
relations, its implications for Icelandic history were of an entirely 
different order, involving signification associated with national 
promotion.  
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After the announcement of the summit, Iceland was thrown 
overnight into the centre of the world stage, where the attention of 
the international media was to remain fixed on the nation and its 
inhabitants during the summit, as well as the days leading up to it. 
News organizations from around the world covered the event, with 
close to 3,000 media personnel arriving in Iceland as the summit 
approached.1 In terms of media exposure, global political importance, 
and complexity of preparation, the summit was unmatched by 
anything else taking place in Icelandic politics and culture at that time. 
The problems involved in hosting the event on such short notice 
were considerable, but the opportunity to present the nation to a 
world audience presumably curious to know more about the place 
chosen by the United States and Soviet leaders for their unexpected 
additional round of discussions also provided unmistakable 
advantages.  
A brief recount of the historical context that preceded the 
decision to organize a summit in Iceland is called for here. When 
Gorbachev came to power as general secretary of the Communist 
Party in 1985, the relationship between the United States and the 
Soviet Union was marked by a deep rift and mutual suspicion. His 
first meeting with Reagan on arms control in Geneva in November of 
1985 turned out to be inconclusive, and Reagan’s subsequent threat to 
withdraw from the SALT II treaty, which placed limits on strategic 
arsenals, was seen as a provocative gesture by European states. The 
ensuing geopolitical situation, with the Soviets still in Afghanistan and 
the two superpowers hardly on speaking terms concerning the nuclear 
threat, was regarded as having reached an extremely dangerous point.2 
Gorbachev, who had initiated the disarmament talks, saw the growing 
European anxiety over nuclear arms as an opportunity to mend 
relations with the continent. He thus began to give talks where he 
openly spoke of the impossibility of defending against nuclear arms. 
He insisted that the only security lay in political settlements. Partly 
due to the success of Gorbachev’s publicity push, Reagan agreed to 
the Reykjavík Summit, while also believing that flaws in their 
economy rendered Soviet power tenuous and their ambitions less 
than global. Reagan’s tendency to personalize politics, and the fact 
                                                                  
1 Magnússon 1986: 17. 
2 Graebner, Burns, & Siracusa 2008: 91. 
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that he found Gorbachev personally likeable, lent a friendly and 
informal tone to the talks. In Reykjavík, the two leaders came close to 
an agreement to completely abolish nuclear weapons. That Reagan 
walked away from such an opportunity, on account of the Soviet 
demand that Strategic Defence Initiative development (also referred 
to as the “Star Wars” plan) be confined to laboratories for five more 
years, has been viewed as one of the great failures of statesmanship in 
recent decades.3 
Occurring at time when it can be argued that Icelanders were 
entering a new phase of self-confidence as a fully modernized 
participant in a globalized world, economically prosperous and ready 
to make their mark, the summit event provides an important 
opportunity to explore the way in which Iceland and Icelandic 
nationality were staged in the media spotlight. In what follows, I will 
look closely at what sort of national images were projected and 
promoted through the event, and how Iceland was situated within the 
North–South geopolitical framework, as well as an East–West 
paradigm that had become central in the material as well as cognitive 
mapping of the world during the Cold War. The 1986 Reykjavík 
Summit will thus be the focus of this paper, although not in the 
traditional way of assessing the political significance of the arms 
control negotiations. Rather, I will explore the media attention 
directed at the host country of the summit; how its peculiarities and 
characteristics were highlighted, manipulated, and presented to an 
international audience; and what all this meant for the international 
promotion and image construction of Iceland as a nation and 
Reykjavík as a place.  
The Reykjavík Summit as Media Event 
“Reykjavík?—what a surprise!”, “Iceland?”, “Iceland!” were the 
exclamations that could be heard from all over the room during the 
White House press meeting called on 30 September 1986 to 
announce the decision to hold a nuclear arms control summit 
between Ronald Reagan, the president of the United States, and 
                                                                  
3 Matlock 2004: 215–251; Graebner, Burns, & Siracusa 2008: 89–113. 
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Soviet general secretary Michael Gorbachev in Reykjavík, Iceland.4 
While the press likes to think of itself as being rarely caught off guard, 
this spontaneous outburst of surprise provides a wonderfully 
unguarded indication of the way in which the unconventional location 
of the meeting appealed to the media, a fact which subsequently 
shaped the coverage of the event. The announcement of the 
Reykjavík Summit was a catch for the media, not only in the primary 
sense that the leaders of the two world superpowers were to meet 
unexpectedly, adding an extra round of talks to the already scheduled 
summits in Washington and Moscow in 1987 and 1988, but also that 
they were meeting in a highly unusual place, which in its obscurity and 
remove from the centres of political power countered and even 
renewed the standard image and protocols of international diplomacy.  
During the summit, a system of exchange came into being where 
the performance of national characteristics went hand in hand with 
enormous media attention, each seeming to influence and magnify the 
other. The intensity of the foreign media’s gaze, and the enthusiastic 
national response, can be seen to have blurred the lines between what 
Joep Leerssen, in his discussion of national images, calls the auto 
image, namely national self-perception and group identity, and the 
hetero image, the opinion of others. In order to articulate the 
dynamics of national identity, performance, media saturation, and 
geopolitics that proved instrumental in creating the meaning of the 
summit, and constructing the image of the host country, it is 
necessary to look more closely at the logics of the media event itself. 
The Reykjavík Summit can be explored in general terms as a 
media event, employing Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz’s 
conceptualization of the phenomenon. Dayan and Katz focus on the 
ceremonial aspects of moments of mass communication, particularly 
those that are broadcast live. They suggest a three-part model for 
interpretation where the syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic aspects of 
televised media events are examined. The first part of the model, the 
syntactic aspect, invokes the structural conventions as well as the 
technical realities of producing coverage of media events. Media 
events are announced beforehand in a manner that allows the media 
                                                                  
4 A clip from the White House press meeting is featured, for example, in the 
programmes Dagsljós: Lei!togafundurinn á Höf!a [Dagsljós: Reykjavík Summit at Höf!i], 
RÚV, 1996, and Lei!togafundurinn [Reykjavík Summit], RÚV, 2006. 
STAGING THE NATION: PERFORMING ICELANDIC NATIONALITY 
 
 
 
[ 439 ] 
time for preparation, and its backers time for promotion and 
publicity, while still keeping the schedule tight enough for the event 
to occur before excitement starts to wane. The coverage of a media 
event involves an interplay between the familiar studio setting and the 
remote site of occurrence, which again involves spatial/technical 
considerations and frequently highlights the “live”-ness of the 
broadcast, its immediacy that is then usually presented with 
considerable reverence and ceremony. The semantic aspect of the 
media event involves its immanent meaning and the manner in which 
organizer and media agents frequently arrive at a joint consensus 
about how the event should be communicated, a meaning which is 
usually proposed in some fashion by the organizer and then shared by 
the media (that a royal wedding should be treated, for example, as a 
“Cinderella story,” or that a presidential election is really about 
“race”). A media event is thus assumed to have a set of core 
meanings, which it is the responsibility of the media to communicate 
in a sufficiently coherent fashion. The third element of their model, 
the pragmatic part, deals with the various economic and business-
related issues that influence decisions about what to cover and the 
calculations involved in the process of “marketing” media events, as 
well as the criteria for success and failure.5 
While the Reykjavík Summit was essentially a step in the ongoing 
nuclear disarmament process that called for negotiations between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, it was structured in a way which 
facilitated a full-scale media event. The summit was, for example, set 
up as a round of one-on-one talks at a specific time and place, 
fostering a sense of spontaneity and intimacy that ran counter to the 
fact that most of the decisions made and the things said at the summit 
were prepared in advance in consultancy with various governmental 
agencies.6 In important ways, the summit was an event governed by 
the laws of political image-play and manipulation on behalf of the 
organizers, no less than the media. The timing and short notice of the 
Reykjavík meeting had puzzled political analysts just as much as the 
location. While a variety of issues influenced Reagan’s acceptance of 
Gorbachev’s proposal, the decisive factor for Reagan’s immediate 
political interests lay in the upcoming mid-term congressional 
                                                                  
5 Dayan & Katz 1994: 25–53. 
6 See for example Gorbachev 2007; Reagan 1991. See also Hollyway 2007; Matlock 
2004. 
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elections for which the Republican Party was fighting to retain key 
seats. The meeting provided Reagan with an opportunity to focus 
attention away from domestic problems to the broader, more popular 
issues of peace and the curbing of international fear of the threat of 
nuclear war, thus working on the “new Reagan” image of the 
peacemaker.7 Gorbachev also seemed quite intent on exploiting the 
summit for maximum media attention, in spite of advance 
announcements on both sides that the summit was to be an informal 
preparatory meeting for Washington. The Soviets surprised the 
Americans on a number of occasions with bold media statements 
during the meeting of their intention of achieving significant and 
unprecedented results in nuclear disarmament.8 The previously 
unannounced appearance of the dazzling Raisa Gorbachova in the 
company of her husband, and her subsequent high-profile public 
appearances and tours to sites of interest in Iceland—which the New 
York Times referred to as a “public relations coup”—furthermore 
demonstrated the way in which the Soviets were intent on catching 
the eye of the world media.9 
The unexpected scheduling and short, although not too short, 
notice, as well as the unusual location, were aspects of the summit 
preparation that can be attributed to the syntactic construction of a 
media event. Iceland was something of a curiosity and an unwritten 
page in the international community, and the press welcomed the 
opportunity of exploring new grounds and having a fresh backdrop 
for the perennial stalemate in the relations between the two nuclear 
arms superpowers. One might even argue that these factors 
revitalized the media attention granted to the arms negotiations and 
their previously somewhat disheartening pace and tone. In terms of 
what Dayan and Katz refer to as the pragmatic side of media events, 
the summit enjoyed undisputed priority in the international media. 
Most importantly, however, the choice of location appealed to the 
semantic construction inherent in the media event, which proved a 
particularly rich site for symbolic connotations and the creation of a 
core meaning or “concept” for the Reykjavík Summit as the event 
that broke the ice in the Cold War stalemate. 
                                                                  
7 Graebner, Burns, & Siracusa 2008: 144. 
8 Magnússon 1986: 43, 71. 
9 Dowd 1986: 12. 
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The organizers named various practical reasons for choosing 
Iceland for the summit. Factors such as manageable border control, 
due to geographic and population factors, and possibilities of securing 
the meeting and dwelling places of the leaders within the short 
timeframe given for preparations were factors that made Iceland’s 
capital suitable for the summit.10 However, the symbolic connotations 
of the choice of location must not be underestimated. The 
geographical location and qualities of the Arctic island did not only 
signal remoteness and natural isolation (and thus protection from 
intruders), but also, and on a different level, strategic centrality on a 
world stage marked by the warring military empires in the East and 
West.11 In its pre-summit speculation on the choice of Reykjavík as a 
meeting place, the BBC news program Panorama cited Soviet foreign 
minister Shevardnadze’s description of Reykjavík as “small, quiet and 
favourable for results,” in contrast with the meeting in Geneva the 
year before where the “media circus” surrounding the summit had 
infuriated the general secretary.12 The remoteness of Iceland, and the 
challenges it would face in accommodating between two and three 
thousand media and press members expected to fly in for such an 
event, would presumably prevent another full-scale media circus or at 
least tone down the interference inherent in public exposure.13 Such 
explanations, however, are hardly plausible, as the location was 
unlikely to deter the international media from arriving in Iceland and 
covering the event, especially given the fact that Iceland’s stakes in 
making arrangements to facilitate a large-scale media event were high. 
However, statements such as the ones cited above did reflect the 
overall attitude towards the meeting, as signalled by both leaders, 
which was that of a small-scale preparation for the more formal 
Washington summit and an opportunity for the leaders to test the 
waters and find, as well as express a will for, a common 
communicative ground before entering into dialogue in Washington 
where pressures for substantial agreements and treaties on arms 
reductions would be too high to allow for failure.14 In this light, the 
                                                                  
10 Holloway 2007: 80–81; Magnússon 1986: 10–11; Hermannsson 2000: 136. 
11 For a discussion of how the Cold War worldview marked by the parameters of East 
vs. West, see for example Arndt 2007. 
12 Bennett et al. (Producers) 1986.  
13 See also Magnússon 1986: 11. 
ICELAND AND IMAGES OF THE NORTH 
 
 
 
[ 442 ] 
selection of Iceland as a meeting place can be regarded not only as an 
attempt to minimize distractions and formalities, but also as a 
figurative construction and articulation of an image where U.S. and 
Soviet leaders demonstrated a willingness to counter and reverse the 
hostile stance of non-communication that had given rise to the 
deadlock in the nuclear arms race in the past. As such, Iceland was 
symbolically positioned midway between the United States and the 
Soviet Union, indicating an openness on behalf of the superpowers to 
“meet midway,” or as Gorbachev was later reported to have explained 
to his aids: “It’s a good idea. Halfway between us and them, and none 
of the great powers will be offended.”15  
 
Figure 1. Soviet general secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. president  
Ronald Reagan pose for the camera in front of a scenic window in Höf!i House,  
with the symbol of Reykjavík neatly positioned between them.  
Photographer: Rax / Ragnar Axelsson. Copyright: Morgunbla!i! / Rax.   
This was in fact not the first time that Iceland’s symbolic centrality 
in the Cold War–determined global map had been exploited. A similar 
use of Iceland as a host nation to communicative and peaceful 
gestures between the East and West had occurred when grand master 
Bobby Fischer played the reigning world champion Boris Spassky in a 
world championship chess match in Reykjavík in 1972. The intense 
                                                                                                                            
14 Matlock 2004: 176. 
15 Matlock 2004: 207. 
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media exposure of the match, and Fischer’s victory, which in the 
West was widely interpreted as the symbolic triumph of the “free 
world” over communist totalitarianism, put Reykjavík’s name on the 
media world map, possibly for the first time.16 Icelanders certainly 
hoped for a repetition of such a success, albeit on a grander scale, in 
relation to the Reykjavík Summit, and it can be stated that the initial 
perception of the summit as a failure devastated the heavily invested 
Icelanders, who were hoping to become associated with a historical 
event ending the Cold War.17 
The notion of Iceland as a nation of peace based on its history of 
military impartiality was furthermore emphasized in various ways in 
relation to the summit. Given the fact that the Iceland, a NATO 
member state, played host to the United States’ important military 
base in Keflavík, such a construction was not without its problems. 
Nevertheless, in a press appearance upon his departure to Iceland, 
Reagan expressed his gratitude to Icelanders for consenting to host 
the event and for working so hard to prepare for it, thus 
demonstrating their “genuine peace interest.”18 The fact that Iceland 
had no military and insufficient police manpower to ensure the 
security of the two leaders, three hundred volunteers, trained for sea 
and land rescue missions, were stationed around Höf!i, the meeting 
centre for the summit, which became a gesture of quite theatrical 
dimensions, naturally catching the attention of the media. This is 
evident in a summit report on London Weekend Television in which 
the lack of reportable news during the highly secretive talks leads the 
reporter to supplement his reportage segment by offering a pictorial 
view of the rescue squad volunteers, wearing their bright orange 
seafarer’s outfits, stoically guarding the most powerful men on the 
planet.19 While the British reporter commented on the scale of the 
event in relation to Iceland’s small police force, it was the Icelandic 
media that provided the desired interpretation of the full symbolic 
meaning of the volunteers’ presence. In a commentary column, Björn 
Bjarnason, assistant editor of Morgunbla!i! newspaper, reflected on the 
“impressive sight” of members of rescue squads taking on a role that 
                                                                  
16 On the associations between the Fischer–Spassky chess match and the Cold War, see 
Edmonds 2004 and Johnson 2007.  
17 See for example Valsson 2009: 361. 
18 Magnússon 1986: 42. 
19 Frost (Presenter) 1986. 
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would otherwise and in other (presumably less “peace-loving”) 
countries be filled by armed soldiers.20 Icelandic officials also stressed 
the peace aspect in their comments to the media. When asked by the 
BBC why he thought Iceland had been chosen for the summit, 
Icelandic prime minister Steingrímur Hermannsson described Iceland 
as a “peaceful country” that had not “had any problems with 
terrorism”, adding that by hosting the meeting Iceland hoped to be 
able to contribute to world peace.21 
The image of Iceland as a neutral and thus fertile ground for peace 
negotiations was somewhat challenged by the BBC Panorama report, 
which highlighted the significance of the Keflavík NATO base for 
American military interests in the Cold War.22 Some commentators in 
fact named Iceland’s strategic position in the North Atlantic as a 
contributing reason for the interest on behalf of not only the U.S., but 
also the Soviets in strengthening diplomatic relations with Iceland via 
the summit.23 Such underlying interests and complexities regarding 
Iceland’s relations with the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were downplayed if 
not obscured in the general image of the event in the global media, in 
which the remoteness and diplomatic “innocence” of Iceland was 
emphasized. As will be demonstrated in greater detail below, the story 
of the isolated, informal, and peaceful nation, flattered at suddenly 
being able to play a role in the development of world peace, became 
the dominant one in media representations of the summit. Thus what 
had previously been seen by the superpowers as the strategic 
geographical position of Iceland was transformed, through the work 
of figuration and image construction, into a symbolic location of 
peace, communicative possibilities, and openness to a new era in 
relations between the East and West. 
Staging a Nation, or, the Doorknob Dilemma 
The media event has become a central concept in a critical tradition 
within media and cultural studies where the influences of spectacular 
                                                                  
20 Bjarnason 1986: 32. 
21 Bennett et al. (Producers) 1986. 
22 Bennett et al. (Producers) 1986. 
23 Magnússon 1986: 15.  
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media on the political landscape of contemporary society are assessed, 
focusing among other things on the staging and representation of 
“reality” in media as well as the way in which the medium itself alters 
and shapes the events being mediated.24 Daniel Boorstin’s The Image, 
originally published in 1961, is an early and now classic statement on 
the various levels of manipulation involved in the staging of events 
that are intended for mass mediation and how the demands of 
programming lead to the institutional creation of what he terms the 
“pseudo-event.” A pseudo-event identifies the communicated 
“version” of an event—that is, reality in its mediated form, subtly 
divorced from the “real” contours of the actual occurrence—and how 
the fact of its mediation may change the meaning of what takes place 
and can also change the way events take place, turning them into 
performance and spectacularizing them, which for Boorstin threatens 
to empty them of content. One way this happens is through the 
movement away from “hard” facts and the truly “news-worthy” to 
secondary or inconsequential issues highlighted in order to produce 
content.25 
Boorstin’s theory of the pseudo-event offers a particularly rich 
perspective on the media coverage of the Reagan–Gorbachev meeting 
in Reykjavík because, while the meeting of the two leaders was set up 
as a media event, the progress of the actual talks was kept secret. For 
Boorstin the categorical imperative of news organizations is that 
content must continually be produced for distribution among the 
growing number of dissemination vehicles, and the pressure to 
continually produce content, meet deadlines, and have an interesting 
“angle” influences and shapes the news commodity to an extensive 
degree. In the face of what was declared by the summit organizers as 
a news blackout, media personnel were frequently left to their own 
devices in terms of coming up with “reportage” from Iceland. 
Margrét Árnadóttir, who was a reporter for the Icelandic State 
Television at the time of the summit, recalls the situation in which the 
foreign reporters and journalists found themselves, most of them 
                                                                  
24 The literature on this subject is vast. Among scholars who have explored how the 
mediation of the image supersedes the real itself are historians and media scholars such 
as Dan Nimmo and Douglas Kellner, cultural critics Susan Sontag and Neal Gabler, 
and poststructuralists such as Marshall McLuhan and Jean Baudrillard. 
25 Boorstin 1992: 3–44. 
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having arrived in Iceland at least three days in advance to cover the 
big event:  
The foreign reporters […] had already mopped up every bit of 
news-worthiness one could possibly find in the days before 
the meetings even began. They had deadlines to meet and they 
simply had to come up with some material.26  
The situation faced by the reporters during the summit would, in 
Boorstin’s terms, present a particularly clear example of the 
contradictions inherent to the media event as such. The political 
importance of the arms negotiations taking place, and the hopes they 
evoked for the solution of the nuclear war threat, could by no means 
be reflected in a mediated form by simply focusing on the two leaders 
and the meeting venue during two long days of intense meetings in 
Höf!i. While Reagan and Gorbachev, as well as their aides and 
security, were occasionally seen entering or emerging from the 
meeting venue, the media personnel stationed outside would find 
themselves mostly focusing on the doorknob of the closed doors of 
the Höf!i house, from which the leaders, it was hoped, would emerge 
with some positive news, perhaps announcing the end of the Cold 
War. This “empty” space of designated prime-time news coverage 
had to be creatively and spontaneously filled by the reporters 
stationed in Iceland. This, in a sense, led to the construction of the 
summit as a “pseudo-event”—a televised and mediated version of the 
summit that existed in only a tangential relationship with reality. 
The demand for interesting visual material and images to provide 
content created a unique space for the promotion of Icelandic history 
and culture, since the somewhat symbolic host nation of the summit 
became the most obvious subject to turn to. Former CNN reporter 
Ralph Begleiter recalls producing news material on as diverse subjects 
as the weather in Iceland and the wrestling career of the Icelandic 
prime minister’s father. “We had a lot of trivia,” Begleiter remembers, 
adding on a more reflective note that the media did in fact, in his 
view, serve an active and important role during the summit, since the 
ability to uphold a mediated “image” of an exiting event had the 
effect of soliciting and sustaining the attention of media audiences: 
                                                                  
26 Sigfússon & Santos (Writers) 2006. 
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“We in the media helped to build up expectations about the outcome 
of the summit.”27 Begleiter’s remark provides an insight into the 
workings of the principles of the media event that reporters must 
adhere to, that is, in ensuring a diligent provision of content, whether 
with trivia or not, thus substituting the uneventful reality of the event 
with the representation of “eventfulness.” 
In the abundant space of airtime and newspaper columns to be 
filled, various national narratives were constructed. An interaction 
between the external and local perspective appeared in the 
constructions of the foreign media on the one hand and the 
promotional efforts of Icelanders themselves on the other. As far as 
the international media were concerned, the conceptual framework, 
or what Dayan and Katz would refer to as the semantic aspect, of the 
event undoubtedly produced an imperative to draw upon the notion 
of the remoteness of the summit host country. Here the Arctic 
geographical location of Iceland was emphasized, even if such 
standard constructions would be combined with more diverse or 
critical perspectives. A feature article on Iceland that appeared in the 
New York Times on 1 October, the day after the announcement of the 
summit, followed the above-mentioned structure of framing its 
profile of the country in terms of remoteness and isolation. Setting 
the tone in a headline which read, “Iceland, Proud, Isolated,” the 
article began by sketching a narrative of a country almost untouched 
by civilization until suddenly looked upon favourably by the mighty 
world leaders. 
Iceland, which is being thrust into the global spotlight as the 
venue for the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting next month, is 
among the world’s most isolated nations, and proudly so. 
President Vigdis Finnbogadottir once attributed Iceland’s rich 
cultural life and the preservation of its language Old Norse, 
the vernacular of the Viking sagas, to “this luck that for 
centuries we were so forgotten.” In less than two weeks, 
however, this isolation will be briefly shattered when Ronald 
Reagan, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, their delegations and a press 
brigade of a perhaps a couple thousand people descend on 
Reykjavik, Iceland’s capital 175 miles south of the Arctic 
                                                                  
27 Sigfússon & Santos (Writers) 2006. 
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Circle. For Iceland, the meeting between the two world leaders 
will present a formidable challenge.28 
The article goes on to touch upon diverse aspects of Icelandic culture 
and nature, as well as discussing the challenges and attention that the 
summit is likely to bring to “small Reykjavik.” Moving from the 
mapping of Iceland as northerly and remote, the article pictures 
Iceland’s central position in the Cold War worldview, mentioning its 
strategic position, its NATO alliance, and the Fischer–Spassky chess 
match, as well as providing a map that displays Iceland as a centre 
point between the U.S. to the left and the Soviet Union to the right, 
thus positioning Iceland in the East–West worldview paradigm. The 
article demonstrates the competing constellations of national 
narratives and spatial contexts that are inevitably at play in national 
cultural representation. ABC correspondent Peter Jennings followed 
the same line of reasoning when he began his broadcast from in front 
of the Icelandic parliament with the following greeting: 
Good morning from this ancient and isolated island in the 
North Atlantic. It’s quite late in the evening here and life is so 
placid and calm that even the international press corps are 
obliged to calm down.29  
An article in Time Magazine concluded its discussion of Iceland, which 
touched upon Soviet–U.S. relations as well as its medieval literary 
heritage, by reiterating the narrative of Iceland’s retrieval from 
oblivion, pointing out that “its very remoteness” had thrust it “into 
center stage” in an ironic twist of fate: “In attracting the two leaders, 
Iceland’s Spartan isolation may have been its major selling point.”30  
The nordicity and remoteness that frequently framed the media 
representation of Iceland as the summit host country draws upon 
exotic notions of the North. As Peter Stadius points out in his 
mapping of various conceptions of the North throughout the ages, 
Iceland has traditionally been included in the imaginative paradigm of 
the Arctic far North. This notion of the North, which has existed in 
                                                                  
28 Lohr 1986: 10. 
29 Sigfússon & Santos (Writers) 2006. 
30 Millington & Wilentz 1986: 36. 
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Western mental mapping since classical times, has predominantly 
been perceived “through a semi-mythological imaginatio borealis, 
subsisting perhaps largely as the idea of something extremely cold, 
exotic and remote.”31 The removal of the far North from central and 
later more northerly European centres of power would imbue 
civilizations of the North with something of an unspoiled innocence, 
a notion that carries in various ways into the popular summit media 
narrative of “the world” suddenly “descend[ing] on Iceland.”32 The 
notion of Iceland as an “exotic” and mythological place was further 
highlighted by the many articles and reports that touched upon the 
Icelandic folk tradition of belief in ghosts, elves, and hidden folk (álfar 
og huldufólk), with the headline of a Vancouver Sun report on the 
Reykjavík Summit, “Land of Hidden Folk Welcomes the Role of 
Summit Host,” providing the most concise example.33 Steingrímur 
Hermannsson recalls in an interview that the most common inquiry 
he received from reporters and journalists during the summit was 
whether he believed in the existence of elves as the majority of 
Icelanders did.34 According to a NBC profile report on Hermannsson, 
the prime minister was quite diplomatic in his answers, and no more 
willing to disturb the delicate balance between the human and other-
worldly in Iceland than he was to openly take sides in the Cold War 
strife, which cut across Iceland like a highway over an elf-inhabited 
rock: “Hermannsson says he’s never seen an Elf or a ghost but won’t 
deny their existence.”35 
Rumours that the summit meeting place itself, Höf!i, was in fact a 
haunted house hit a home run with the international media. Jón 
Hákon Magnússon, a media and public relations manager during the 
summit, remembers the sensation that the story about ghosts in 
Höf!i caused in the press, earning the event the media nickname 
“summit of the haunted house.”36 While most reports managed to 
                                                                  
31 Stadius 2005: 14–15; Stadius 2001. 
32 Dowd 1986: 12.  
33 “Land of Hidden Folk Welcomes the Role of Summit Host” 1986. 
34 Sigfússon & Santos (Writers) 2006. 
35 Brokaw (Reporter) 1986. 
36 Sigfússon & Santos (Writers) 2006. Magnús Óskarsson, the city official in charge of 
selecting the meeting place for Reagan and Gorbachev, also recalls how the story of 
Höf!i as a haunted house caught on among the international media; see Óskarsson 
1997: 180.  
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squeeze in a mention of the ghosts sharing the negotiation table with 
the world leaders, an article in the Los Angeles Times engaged Vigdís 
Finnbogadóttir, the president of Iceland, in a detailed discussion 
about the ghost that haunted her official residence. The ghost, 
apparently an 18th-century broken-hearted sweetheart of the 
Governor of Iceland named Apollonia Schwartzkopf, would roam the 
house at night, sometimes keeping the president awake: 
Sometimes she comes up the stairs and walks in the corridors 
outside my room. And I say to her: “Please, Apollonia dear, be 
very welcome.”37 
 
 
Figure 2. Höf!i House, the meeting place of the summit, was rumoured to be haunted. 
A 1986 Herblock Cartoon, copyright by The Herb Block Foundation. 
Here the president can be seen to express a similar diplomatic 
approach to her supernatural co-inhabitant as the prime minister 
upon being asked about ghosts and elves. 
The above examples provide an opportunity to consider which 
national characteristics and narratives the media actively subscribed to 
in their construction of a national image, but also the role that 
                                                                  
37 Wallis 1986: 18. 
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Icelandic representatives came to play in the process of negotiating 
those images. In this context Icelandic representatives were generally 
more eager to uphold a de-marginalized image of their nationality, 
and here again the notions of “northernness” came to the forefront, 
although in a different conceptual context. The somewhat 
marginalizing and fantastic notion of the far North in European 
mental mapping can be contrasted with more recent 19th-century 
conceptions of the North, in which neo-Romantic and racial theories 
contributed to the project of shifting the core of European power 
from the southern Greco-Roman region to the rapidly industrializing 
countries of northern Europe.38 Here the North, with its harsh forces 
of nature and wilderness, is associated with strength, purity, and 
freedom, and its culture is associated with a revival of the classicism 
of the Hellenic Greeks.39 The national promotional efforts organized 
by Icelandic authorities would stress such a positive image of Iceland, 
in which the following aspects would be particularly promoted: the 
Viking and medieval literary heritage, the “purity” of the language and 
of Icelandic natural food products, and the inherent strength and 
beauty of the Icelandic people, the former often explained as a result 
of surviving the harsh northern climate and the latter with the 
unspoiled countryside and fresh air, as well as the Nordic Viking racial 
lineage.40 A revealing example of efforts on behalf of Icelandic 
officials to promote certain aspects of its culture and heritage can be 
found in a bold attempt that seems to have been made to provide the 
media with “story suggestions” for their coverage. A leaflet prepared 
for foreign journalists by the Icelandic government with suggestions 
of “story ideas” caught the attention of a Los Angeles Times journalist, 
who cited some of the suggestions made in the leaflet, perhaps on 
account of its presumptuousness: 
an interview with Halldor Laxness, the Icelandic winner of the 
Nobel Prize in Literature; an article on Snorri Sturlason, the 
medieval author of some of Iceland’s famous sagas, and an 
interview with Holmfridur Karlsdottir, the 22-year-old 
reigning Miss World.41 
                                                                  
38 See for example Ísleifsson 2002, 2007. 
39 Ísleifsson 2002: 121. 
40 "orvaldsdóttir 2001; Jóhannsdóttir 2006. 
41 Meisler 1986: 15. 
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The attempt made here to influence the image construction of Iceland 
reveals an interesting act of making connections between past and 
present, where on the one hand the medieval cultural heritage of the 
“Golden Age” is emphasized and on the other hand a splendid 
“embodiment” of Icelandic Viking heritage, the blond Icelandic 
beauty queen, is presented to the media. 
An international media centre set up in Melaskóli elementary 
school in connection with the summit became the base for 
promotional campaigns for Icelandic nature and culture. The Trade 
Council of Iceland arranged for the promotion of Icelandic food and 
produce, and various attractions were brought in. Hólmfrí!ur 
Karlsdóttir made herself available for interviews at the centre, after 
being urgently summoned back to Iceland from her Miss World tour 
abroad to contribute to the promotion of Iceland at the summit. 
According to Gu!mundur Magnússon’s account, Hólmfrí!ur was 
among the three Icelanders who enjoyed most attention by the 
foreign media, the others being Prime Minister Steingrímur 
Hermannsson and President Vigdís Finnbogadóttir, the world’s first 
democratically elected female president.42 Jón Páll Sigmarsson, the 
Icelandic 1985 champion of the World’s Strongest Man Competition, 
was also called upon to participate in promotional events. According 
to the Los Angeles Times journalist, press members were invited to 
enter their business cards in a lucky draw, from which the Icelandic 
strongman was to draw lucky winners of prizes that included salmon 
products, Icelandic wool sweaters, and a trip to Iceland in the 
summer.43 The above-mentioned Icelandic heads of state furthermore 
came to embody the strength and beauty of their people. The photos 
taken during a photo-op of the elegant and blond Vigdís 
Finnbogadóttir in a becoming red coat, taking a friendly stroll outside 
the presidential residency with the tall and broad-shouldered 
President Reagan, were among the most iconic images of the entire 
summit. The prime minister furthermore came to both perform and 
accentuate the image of inherent national strength (as well as 
casualness) during one of his many moments of media exposure, as 
he was filmed and interviewed during his daily swim in one of 
                                                                  
42 In their biographies, Steingrímur Hermannson and Vigdís Finnbogadóttir describe 
their encounters with an enthusiastic media at the summit. See Eggertsson 2000; 
Valsson 2009. 
43 Meisler 1986: 15. 
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Iceland’s geothermal public swimming pools. A segment introducing 
Hermannsson, who is shown in his bathing suit diving into and 
swimming across the pool, opens with the reporter’s voiceover: “We 
are right on the edge of the Arctic circle and it can be a tough place to 
live—it helps to be strong…”44 In a cut to the now fully dressed 
prime minister standing at the poolside, a brief interview follows, in 
which Hermannsson explains the possible reasons for his nation’s 
inherent strength. Drawing upon a social-Darwinist climate theory, he 
points out that Icelanders through the centuries have been faced with 
extremely “harsh weather and climate,” which may have caused only 
“the strong ones” to survive.45 
 
Figure 3. The photo taken of Vigdís Finnbogadóttir and Ronald Reagan  
became one of the most iconic images of the Reykjavík Summit.  
Photographer: Rax / Ragnar Axelsson. Copyright: Morgunbla!i! / Rax. 
The active performance of a national identity aligned with 
Northern conceptions of strength, purity, and “Arian” beauty can be 
linked to the broader nationalistic mood that characterized the 1980s 
as a period of national self-discovery and aspirations to achieve a 
more central position in the world stage.46 Here, the Icelandic Miss 
                                                                  
44 Sigfússon & Santos (Writers) 2006. 
45 Sigfússon & Santos (Writers) 2006. 
46 The notion of the 1980s as an era of national confidence is discussed in 
Bernhar!sson 1998 and Valsson 2009: 355. 
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World and the World’s Strongest Man can be seen as central figures 
onto which the national imagination latched in the construction of a 
confident national identity. Jón Páll Sigmarsson had as an athlete 
developed a strong and popular media persona and was famous for 
his self-congratulating comments in moments of victory in the 
various weightlifting and strongman competitions in which he 
partook. One of his slogans was: “I am not an Eskimo—I am a 
Viking.”47 This concise declaration, performed for the media, reflects 
Icelanders’ attempt to influence and “correct” an extremely unpopular 
hetero-image of Iceland as an Arctic Inuit culture, thus moving from 
the image of the “far North” to the more centralized and powerful 
“Hellenic North.” A summit-related article in the New York Times 
addressed Icelanders’ dilemma of “overcoming the Igloo Image” in 
relation to an interview with Steingrímur Hermannsson in which he 
recalls the frustrating misconceptions that he was faced with as a 
engineering student in the United States, where he was frequently 
asked whether Icelanders lived in igloos.48 This symbolic expression 
of Icelanders’ aspirations towards a more “favourable” national 
identity in terms of the “igloo dilemma” can perhaps be seen to map 
out the parameters of that process. 
Conclusion: Remembering Reykjavík 
While the 1986 Reykjavík Summit has marked its place in political 
history as an important, if somewhat debated, moment in the 
development and eventual end of the Cold War, it lives in the 
Icelandic national consciousness as a moment of opportunity and 
success. The narrative of how Icelanders managed against all odds to 
provide the facilities and services necessary to successfully host both a 
political and media event on such a large scale has been incorporated 
into a national narrative of Iceland’s process of becoming a visible 
and credible participant in the globalized international community.49 
                                                                  
47 See for example "ór!arson 2006. 
48 Lohr 1986: 14. 
49 Interesting in this context is an account of the summit in a special supplement of 
Iceland Review, referred to by the editors as “a commermorative album.” The publication 
date of the album is not specified, but it was issued in relation to the twenty-fifth 
publication year of the magazine, which was in 1988. The narrative of the edition tells 
the story of an unknown and peaceful country receiving the attention and opportunity 
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Institutional commemorations of the summit manifest themselves in 
the heritage site that Höf!i now houses, while a more fluid and oral 
“writing” of the historical narrative of the “success” of the summit 
event in a national context can be discerned from commemorative 
efforts, such as television programmes about the summit, produced 
by the Icelandic State Television on the occasions of the ten- and 
twenty-year anniversaries of the Reykjavík Summit.50 
However, national narratives and constructions of communal 
identities need to be kept under constant critical scrutiny, and as an 
unique event in the history of a small nation, the Reykjavík Summit 
provides us with an opportunity to examine the configurations of 
national images that came to light when the international spotlight 
was momentarily fixed on Iceland and to explore their meanings and 
connotations. Constructivist approaches to the concepts of nation 
and nationalism, established in recent writings of scholars such as 
Benedict Anderson and Homi Bhabha, usefully remind us of the 
active processes required to maintain a nationalist discourse, in which 
we become both subjects and objects of various social narratives.51 
Rather than simply existing as a natural and causal lineage, the 
preferred link between a national past and its perceived present and 
future is drawn and cultivated and brought to bear upon the projected 
national image. Thus, although national identities may exist as a state 
of mind, those figments of imagination are frequently sustained with 
reference to essentialist nationalistic discourses.52  
The opportunistic mode and commercial imperative of the “media 
event” furthermore reveals, perhaps more clearly than in other 
contexts, the instability and constructiveness of the national images 
that were performed and represented in relation to the Reykjavík 
Summit. Within the narrativization of Iceland as the summit host 
country, conflicting representations coexisted that related to the 
mental mappings of the political worldview at the time and to more 
complex parameters of the development of Icelandic national identity. 
The notion of Iceland as a remote, isolated, and exotic island 
                                                                                                                            
of a lifetime and excelling in its role as summit host. Iceland Review 1988. See also 
Magnússon 1986: 21–22. 
50 Másson et al. (Writers) 1996; Sigfússon & Santos (Writers) 2006. 
51 Bhabha 1990: 292. 
52 Anderson 1991: 19. 
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community appealed to the media as a useful conceptual framework 
to present an uneventful diplomatic meeting as exiting news material. 
Similarly, the parties behind the summit interpreted the smallness and 
military impartiality of Iceland as an ideal backdrop for an event 
intended to signal a new will for peace negotiations. Here the 
remoteness of Iceland was construed as centrality in the sense that 
Iceland was geographically positioned “midway” between the warring 
empires. The external perspective, however, interacted with a local 
discourse in which various national stereotypes of the strong and 
purebred nation, the inherent link between nature and cultural 
heritage, and the exotic beliefs in supernatural beings were trotted 
onto the stage as constitutive elements of national identity. As most 
of the narratives which were performed and constructed have become 
familiar tropes in the representation of Iceland today, the summit is 
an interesting focal point to trace the way in which dominant national 
images have, at the conjunction of external and internal discourses, 
been formed, shaped, and imagined. 
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